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Webber, Justice:
Defendants appeal from an order of the circuit court of McLean County
sitting in administrative review (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 264 et
seq.) which reversed an order of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners
of the City of Bloomington (Board). The Board's order discharged plaintiff
from his position as a police officer for the city.
The principal issue on appeal concerns the use of polygraph examinations
and the results thereof in administrative hearings.
The facts giving rise to the litigation are these. Shortly before 6 a.m.
on May 5, 1979, a burglary was discovered at a restaurant at the Bloomington-
Normal airport. Evidence before the Board established that plaintiff had
been in the area about 5 a.m. on the same date on routine patrol. Two other
officers, Rouse and Aikin, arrived at about 5:15 a.m., also on routine
inspection, and observed plaintiff's squad car parked near the scene of the
break-in. One of them testified that at that time he saw nothing amiss with
the door which was later found to have been forced open by breaking the dead
bolt on it. None of the three officers present in the area at the time
observed one another. Rouse and Aikin returned to the stationhouse to run a
license check on another automobile which they observed in the airport parking
lot next to plaintiff's squad car.
All three officers, plaintiff, Rouse, and Aikin, were present in the
stationhouse when the burglary was reported at about 6 a.m., and Rouse and
Aikin were detailed to the scene. Plaintiff, who was not detailed, also went
back to the airport and discussed the crime with the restaurant owner. He
also examined the restaurant office where an unsuccessful attempt had been
made to open a safe, took some measurements, and left before the end of his
shift at 7 a.m. A detective, requested by Rouse and Aikin, arrived between
7:10 and 7:15 a.m.
Rouse and Aikin became suspicious of plaintiff and reported their sus-
picions to Harold Bosshardt, Bloomington police chief and defendant herein.
After some investigation, the chief, who became concerned about rumors of a
police officer being involved in the burglary, requested Rouse, Aikin, and
plaintiff to submit to polygraph examinations. He testified before the Board
that he hoped by means of the polygraph to disprove the rumors. These first
examinations were conducted by Robert Abson, later deceased.
Nothing further appears in the record concerning the examinations of
Rouse and Aikin and it may therefore be assumed that the chief was satisfied
with those results. However, he ordered plaintiff to be re-examined by
Abson and later by Harry Lockhard, another polygraph operator of Champaign,
Illinois. Subsequently, Bosshardt ordered plaintiff, Rouse, and Aikin 
to sub-
mit written reports to him concerning the incident and to answer specific
questions posed by him.
Bosshardt informed plaintiff that he had become "disenchanted" 
with the
results of plaintiff's polygraph examinations and requested plaintiff's
resignation. Upon plaintiff's refusal, the chief then filed charges 
against
him of neglect of duty and inefficiency, and alternatively, failure 
to report
a burglary and making a false report concerning the burglary. 
The Board sus-
pended plaintiff pending a hearing.
After a continuance, the Board held a hearing on November 16, 1979.
Various witnesses, including Rouse, Aikin, Bosshardt and plaintiff, 
as well
as persons connected with the restaurant and the airport, testified. 
The
Board also heard evidence concerning the polygraph examinations. 
The parties
stipulated as to the qualifications of the examiners and the proper 
conduct
of the examinations. However, plaintiff's counsel objected to the results of
the tests on the basis of reliability. Ruling on the objection was reserved.
Abson himself was dead at the time of the hearing but his 
first report
showed that he believed that plaintiff was not being truthful 
at his first
examination. His report of the second examination indicated that 
he believed
that plaintiff was deliberately distorting the polygraph and that 
it had been
his experience that when one distorts in such a manner, he is 
doing so to
avoid detection.
Lockhard testified that he had tested plaintiff, and, in his opinion
plaintiff was not being truthful.
On December 3, 1979, the Board issued its order disposing of 
pending
motions, making findings of fact, and directing the dismissal 
of plaintiff.
The order overruled plaintiff's objection to the polygraph results together
with his motion to exclude them and stated inter alia:
". . . With the admission of the test results, the
Board is satisfied that the charges are substantiated
by a clear preponderance of the evidence. Without the
admission of the test results, the Board is satisfied
that the charges are not substantiated by a clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence . . ."
Plaintiff timely moved the Board to reconsider and to reopen for
additional evidence. The motion was allowed and at a supplemental 
hearing
held February 25, 1980, evidence was received from three additional polygraph
examiners, Jenkins, Floyd, and Bowers. While the record is less than 
absolutely
clear on the point, there is a prima facie indication that each of 
these
examinations was made at the request of the Board.
Jenkins and Bowers testified that their results showed that plaintiff 
was
being truthful when he denied any involvement with the burglary. 
Floyd's
report indicated that his examination was inconclusive.
Following the February 1980 hearing, the Board issued a supplemental
order, affirming its earlier findings and order of dismissal and stated inter
alia:
"The Board continues to be confident of the
pre-December 3, 1979 polygraph examinations and
continues to place substantial weight on them
"The opportunity for reflection since the
December 3, 1979 hearing has made the Board even
more confident about the accuracy of its determination
and its factual basis in the record.
A court's scope of review of an administrative agency's decision is well
known and requires no extended reiteration here. First, the court must
determine whether the agency's findings of fact are contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. (Department of Mental Health and Developmental Dis-
abilities v. Civil Service Com. (1981), 85 lll.2d 547, 55 Ill.Dec. 560, 426
N.E.2d 885. However as the trial court pointed out in its memorandum opinion,
the instant case requires more than that determination. We must first decide
a question of law, namely, whether the findings of fact were based upon
inadmissible evidence, and, if so, as to what extent that evidence influenced
the decision of the administrative agency.
We then come to the heart of the matter: Are polygraph examinations and
their results admissible as substantive proof in an administrative proceeding?
We think not.
Two statutes in this State deal with polygraph tests. On the criminal
side there is section 8b of division XIII of the Criminal Code of 1874
(Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 155-Il). On a civil side there is section
54.1 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 110. par. 54.1). These
statutes are essentially parallel and in substance prohibit a court from
requiring a criminal defendant, or a civil plaintiff or defendant, to submit
to a polygraph test. Even the most superficial inspection of the statutes
reveals that they in no wise deal with the admission of evidence. Furthermore,
it has been repeatedly held that they do not apply to administrative proceedings.
Village of South El in v. Pollution Control Board (1978), 64 Ill.App.3d 565,
21 Ill.Dec. 451, 381 .E.2d 778; Chambliss v. Board of Fire & Police Com-
missioners (1974), 20 IlIl.App.3d 24, 312 N.E.2d 842; Austin v. Board of Fire
& Police Commissioners (1972), 7 lll.App.3d 537, 288 N.E.2d 113; Coursey v.
Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1967), 90 lll.App.2d 31, 234 N.E.2d 339.
Village of South Elgin stands for the broad proposition that the Civil
Practice Act does not apply to administrative proceedings. The other cases
dealt with polygraph examinations, but none of them presented the precise
question involved in the instant case. The closest one is Chambliss wherein
polygraph results were admitted into the record in an administrative proceed-
ing, but this was done without objection and counsel for the officer examined
and cross-examined as to the results. "Consequently, . . . the results of
the tests . . . could be considered by the Board in making its decision."
(Emphasis added.) 20 lll.App.3d 24, 32, 312 N.E.2d 842, 847.
To ''consider" the results is a far cry from the firm reliance placed
on them as shown in the Board's order in the instant case. Furthermore,
Chambliss was questioned in Bart v. Department of Law Enforcement (1977),
52 Ill.App.3d 487, 10 Ill.Dec.320, 367 N.E.2d 773, although the Bart court
did not have occasion to pass upon the question, and it was the officer who
was urging the admission of the polygraph. In Coursey, the holding was
that the refusal of an officer to take a polygraph test was a valid ground
for discharge and the court did not reach the question of admissibility.
In Austin, all that was known was that a test had been administered. The
results were also known, but they were not admitted into evidence and the
Board there was admonished to ignore them in reaching its decision.
We therefore conclude that the statutes which prohibit a court, but
not an administrator or administrative agency, from requiring a polygraph
test do not by innuendo allow its admission into evidence in the ensuing
administrative proceeding.
This statement is not intended in any fashion to dilute the potency of
the polygraph as an investigatory tool. A.s the Courey court said:
"Effective and efficient operation of a
police department requires that allegations of
police misconduct be thoroughly investigated. The
polygraph machine can be a useful investigative
tool when the test is skillfully prepared and is
administered and interpreted by a qualified person;
while it is not accurate to the degree that absolute
judgments can be made as to the veracity of the
person tested /-citation 7 the results are often
reliable within recognizid limits. Thus, for
example, the results of a polygraph examination
may be of help in narrowing the field of persons
suspected of an offense or may assist in a deter-
mination whether to commence disciplinary action
when, as here, there is an accusation against a
police officer which he insists is untrue." 90 Ill.
App.2d 31, 43 234 N.E.2d 339, 344-45.
In an era which worships technology at the expense of cerebration,
the polygraph has attained a stature and an acceptance in the public mind
far in advance of that achieved in the world of jurisprudence. Coursey and
other related cases (e.g., Buege v. Lee (1978), 56 lll.App.3d 793, 14 111.
Dec. 416, 372 N.E.2d 427) recognize its usefulness in dispelling doubts
raised in the public arenas of mass communications towards the integrity of
police departments. However, wide public acceptance is no proof of reli-
ability; examples abound: the steamship Titanic, the drug thalidomide, the
Insull business empire.
The reliability of the polygraph, together with the case law and its
attendant legal literature, is exhaustively reviewed in People v. Monigan
(1979), 72 lll.App.3d 87, 28 Ill.Dec. 395, 390 N.E.2d 562, so we find no
necessity to reiterate it here. Suffice it to say, we agree with what is
said there on the subject. The day may come when the reliability of the
polygraph will be sufficiently established to allow its results to be
admitted into evidence, but that must await another time and another court.
For the nonce, it remains an investigative tool.
Defendants make-the further argument that the polygraph results are
admissible by reason of section 12(2) of the Administrative Review Act
(lll.Rev.Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 275(2)) providing in substance that the
failure of an administrative agency to observe the technical rules of
evidence shall not be grounds for reversal of its decision. No authority
of which we are aware indicates that this statute abrogates all of the rules
of evidence in an administrative proceeding. In a sense, all rules are
technical, but we find the statement in Novicki v. Department of Finance
(1940), 373 Ill. 342, 344, 26 N.E.2d 130, 131, particularly appropriate:
" . . . Counsel for appellant suggests, and we
think rightly so, that this provision / section 8
of the Retailers' Occupation Tax act, similar in
nature to the statute involved in the instant
case 7 may permit the asking of leading questions
and other informalities in the introduction of
evidence, but that the legislature did not intend
by section 8 to abrogate the fundamental rules of
evidence."
Furthermore, section 12(2) contains a proviso that the failure to
observe the rules shall not be ground for reversal unless the failure
"materially affected the rights of any party and resulted in substantial
injustice to him." It is difficult to imagine a greater effect upon one's
rights than the loss of one's job.
Defendants also make the argument that the Board possessed sufficient
sophistication to ignore incompetent evidence in the manner of a trial judge
sitting at bench. This appears totally inconsistent with the Board's order
which recites almost total reliance upon the polygraph evidence.
Having decided that the admission of the polygraph results tainted the
entire proceeding, we must next determine what is to be done with this case.
Defendants argue here, and apparently also argued to the trial court, that
there is sufficient evidence aliunde the polygraph results to support the
order of the Board. The trial court found, and we agree, that this approach
was not taken by the Board at the hearing stage. Both orders rely almost
entirely on the polygraph. It therefore is appropriate that a new hearing
be had without the polygraph evidence. This becomes doubly important, since
it will also become the initial responsibility of the Board to fix any penalty.
Here the statement of the supreme court in Department of Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Com., 85 lll.2d 547 at 552, 55
Ill.Dec. 560 at 562, 426 N.E.2d 885 at 887, is significant:
"We agree with the appellate court de-
cisions finding that the question of whether
cause for discharge exists should be determined
by the administrative agency. We therefore hold
that the agency's decision as to cause will not
be reversed unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable or
unrelated to the requirements of service. /-Citation. 7"
In the instant case it cannot be determined on the existing record and
orders whether (1) the findings are against the manifest weight of the
evidence and (2) whether any decision as to cause is arbitrary, unreasonable
and unrelated to the requirements of service.
The order of the circuit court that polygraph detection deception tests
may not be admitted into evidence over objection in administrative pro-
ceedings is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the circuit court of
McLean County with directions to remand it further to the Board of Fire and
Police Commissioners of Bloomington for a new hearing without polygraph
evidence from which the Board may make new findings of fact and assess any
penalty appropriate thereto, and for further proceedings in accordance with
the views expressed herein. Reinhardt v. Board of Education of Alton
Community School District No. 11 (1975), 61 11l.2d 101, 329 N.E.2d. 218.
Affirmed in part and remanded with directions.
TRAPP, P.J., and LONDRIGAN, J., concur.
Quer: Could the Court have held that the polygraph results are admissible
by im lication under the civil and criminal statutes, and expressly under
the Administrative Review Act), but are not, in themselves, of sufficient
reliability to form the basis of decision? Was the Court influenced by the
fact that the Board, after the first administrative hearing, expressly stated
that the negative examinations tipped the balance in favor of dismissing the
police officer, but that, after the second hearing, at which favorable test
results were introduced, adhered to its judgment of dismissal? Is this a
sound basis for excluding polygraph examination results from all administra-
tive hearings, or all police disciplinary cases? Note that the opinion does
not deal with the Board's reason for accepting the earlier test results, nor
does it disclose whether the Board gave a reason.
A future issue of this Journal will give more extended treatment to
the use of polygraph examinations -in administrative hearings.
